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T R O T T E R

R E V I E W

The Somali Diaspora
in Greater Boston
Paul R. Camacho, Abdi Dirshe, Mohamoud Hiray,
and Mohamed J. Farah
East Africans as America’s Newest Immigrants
Our nation was founded on and thrives on immigration. One
of the newest immigrant groups in the Boston area are Somalis. They
are among the largest of the new populations of African immigrants.
While precise numbers are very difficult to determine, there are
approximately 8,000 in the Greater Boston area and another 2,000
estimated across the rest of Massachusetts. Very few studies have
examined Somalis in the United States, and no studies exist on the
community in Boston or Massachusetts.
It is an interesting sociological question to ask how similar the
Somali experience has been in the United States (and in Boston) compared with other immigrant groups. In this article, we will attempt to
suggest some plausible answers to that question, but a definitive answer
awaits a formal research study.
Turmoil, poverty, and war—particularly civil war—are powerful
motivating factors in the migration of large numbers of people away
from their cultural roots. These circumstances have certainly been
present in the case of the failed state of Somalia. Prior to the outbreak
of civil war in 1991, the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, was actually a
tourist destination. But since then Somalia in general and the capital
of Mogadishu have come to represent one of the worst cases in nation
state failure and chaos in civil war.
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Supporting Enterprise, Culturally
Saido Farah (left) and Deeqo Jibril pause before stocked shelves in a Somali-owned
store, Farah’s Roots Halal Meat Market in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of
Boston. Islam’s ban on interest-bearing loans creates financial challenges for
Somali immigrants who open small businesses. Photo by Talia Whyte/Inter Press
Service (IPS). Reprinted by permission.

Arrival in the Diaspora
The trickle of Somalis who came to the United States during the
1970s and 1980s were oriented toward acquiring professional training
and/or pursuing small business opportunities of the kind that many
ethnic immigrant families run: grocery stores, butcher shops, clothing
stores, convenience stores, or restaurants. The large stream of refugees
began soon after militia armies defeated government forces in 1991.
Comparatively speaking, these emigrations involved huge numbers—
literally thousands—fleeing the chaos.
From the late 1990s to present, the young Somali immigrant
population has mirrored other segments of the youth population in
the United States, with a number of individuals pursuing opportunities in higher education, professional development, and small business, while others are not succeeding and are in danger of succumbing
to personal disinvestment in their new country. Those who fail to latch
onto socioeconomic opportunity are likely to see their energies channeled toward lower-paying jobs in the service sector—or worse.
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Since 1998, many of those in the first and second waves of Somali
immigrants, who have been educated in the United States, are actually now looking for jobs overseas, where their training will ensure a
relatively higher standard of living. Kenya and the Middle East are major
destinations because Somalis constitute a sizable segment of the business sector in those areas. A number of Somali-American professionals
from Boston area have found jobs and settled with their families in the
Middle East (primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates).
Authors’ Subset and Modification of Table 52, Population by Selected
Ancestry Group and Region: 2006
Ancestry

Number
Total

Pct.

Pct. Sub-Saharan
Only

Sub-Saharan
African

2,540,781

Cape Verdean

88,420

3.5%

9.2%

Ethiopian

151,491

6.0%

15.8%

Ghanaian

79,510

3.1%

8.3%

Kenyan

37,795

1.5%

3.9%

Liberian

44,873

1.8%

4.7%

Nigerian

237,527

9.3%

24.8%

Senegalese

10,341

0.4%

1.1%

Sierra Leonean

14,365

0.6%

1.5%

Somali

91,016

3.6%

9.5%

South African

53,974

2.1%

5.6%

Sudanese

40,261

1.6%

4.2%

Ugandan

5,058

0.2%

0.5%

Zimbabwean

4,410

0.2%

0.5%

Author’s Modification, sub-Saharan
African Total:

958,735

(Authors’ Comment: Possibly
non-sub-Saharan
African) African

1,588,718

62.5%

Other sub-Saharan
African

99,694

3.9%

Total & Pct. Total

2,547,453

100%

See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, National Data
Book, 2009. Table 52. Population by Selected Ancestry Group and Region: 2006
Available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf.
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Somali Global Demographics
Accurate data on the Somali population worldwide is only available in fragments. Figures vary widely and are virtually always underestimated. Since 2000, the Diaspora’s population has multiplied manyfold
and is thought to represent some 14 percent of the Somali population.
This has prompted the latest UN-sponsored report to call the Somali
population a truly global population.1 For example, Somalis are the largest non-European ethnic minority in Finland, with a community of 9,000.
There has been a huge influx of individuals into the United States
and Canada since 2000. UN data indicate that there were only 25,000
Somalis in the United States and 30,000 in Canada in 2000. North American activists from the Somali community have estimated that there are
as many as 150,000 Somalis in the United States and another 150,000 in
Canada. These activist estimates are anecdotal in that they are based on
the community’s general awareness of their numbers who receive state
or local governmental services, the number of (Somali) children in various schools, community self-help organizations’ estimates of their client
base, and so forth. Those figures for both countries may be high. Census
Bureau information from the 2009 Statistical Abstract National Data
Book indicates that there were (as of 2006) some 91,000 Somalis in the
United States. The 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates
indicate that there were 120,102 with a margin of error of +/- 10,979,2
representing roughly 3.6 percent of all African refugees or immigrants
and 9.5 percent of all sub-Saharan Africans in the nation.3 The Canadian
government’s National Household Survey places the Somali immigrant
population at only 44, 995.4 Further, although this particular survey was
voluntary and only 20 percent of households were contacted, the 2006
census indicated there were only 37,790 of Somali heritage.5 Currently it
is thought that some 14 percent of the Somali population, or one million
people, live in the Diaspora worldwide.6
Depending on the estimate, Somalis are arguably the third
largest sub-Saharan African group in the United States, after Nigerians and Ethiopians, and they outnumber Cape Verdeans, who started
immigrating during the 19th century. Further, anecdotal evidence
indicates that Somali immigrants are having large families ( four to six
children), and thus the Somali-American population can be expected
to grow substantially over the next few decades.
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Somali Global Diaspora Population, 2000
Country

Population

Netherlands

25,000

United Kingdom

20,000

Denmark

14,000

Sweden

12, 000

United States

25,000

Canada

30,000

Norway

4,000

Finland

5,300

Switzerland

5,400

Germany

8,400

Italy

20,000

Australia

2,000

Saudi Arabia

20,000

United Arab Emirates

25,000

Source: Joakim Gundel, The Migration-Development Nexus: Somalia Case Study;
available via http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Gundel%20-%20Dev%20
Mig%20Nexus%20Somalia%20.pdf

In Canada, Toronto has the greatest population of Somali
residents. That number, however, has been declining as more Somalis
seek opportunities in the better economies of western Canada. In the
United States, Minneapolis is home to approximately 60,000 SomaliAmericans and refugees. Other American cities have lesser populations: Columbus, Ohio, 30,000; Atlanta, 15,000; and Seattle, 10,000.
Approximately 28 percent of the people now residing in Boston
were born in another country.7 In Massachusetts there are about
10,000 Somalis, with roughly 8,000 residing in Boston. Roxbury and
Charlestown are home to the largest concentrations, with smaller
communities in Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, and East Boston.
The civil war surged, abated, and surged again in seemingly endless iterations across Somalia. This necessitated the separation of family members into different safe zones within Somalia and neighboring
nations, and other parts of the globe, through emigration. As they
settled in new nations, these immigrants have sought to reestablish
relations with nuclear and extended family members who left prior or
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subsequent to their own departure. As a result, Somalis in one nation
have contacts with family or friends around the world.
The Terrorist Concern
Three Consequences of Terror and U.S. Policy for the Somali Community
■ U.S. support for the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia was opposed by the
Somali American population and was a critical factor in creating a relatively unified
Somali American, Somali Canadian front for political action to change U.S. policy.
Prior to the Ethiopian invasion, this level of unity would not have been possible.
With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, the continuation of these North American alliances is uncertain.
■ The intelligence community’s reaction to these events has been intimidating at
ports of entry, and Somali Americans have a certain dread of the questioning
they will almost surely undergo. U.S. agents have visited a number of Somali
Americans in connection with the global war on terror. The apprehension created has fostered an atmosphere that allows stereotyping and discrimination to
develop in various communities across the nation and made new Somali
immigrants suspicious of seeking assistance. There are no ombudsman-type
functionaries who can address individual and community issues on their behalf.
There are few outlets for the community’s anxiety and frustration.
■ Finally, there are a number of less-than-credible leaders or leaders with narrow
followings who have presented themselves to the media and political figures as
spokespersons for the wider community.

Despite the many negative articles in mainstream media focusing
on the population of extreme Islamic militants known as Al-Shabaab
and the anxious concerns of various agencies about perhaps two-dozen
Somali youth who returned to Somalia in the last few years, there are
a number of distinct signs of a growing process of “Americanization.”8
There is no case of a Somali-American who has traveled outside the
United States returning and engaging in politically or religiously motivated violence. Yet, concerns escalated when the Islamic Courts Union
came to power in Mogadishu in 2006. In turn, this development led
to the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, which the Somali community
viewed as an American-sponsored or -sanctioned effort. With the rise
of Al-Shabaab and its call to Muslims to wage jihad in Somalia, several
young Somalis heeded the call, committing suicide bombings in their
nation. In October 2011, the New York Times reported that a SomaliAmerican was identified as the bomber in an attack that killed several
African peacekeepers in Mogadishu and that as many as 20 young
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Somali men had left the United States to join Al-Shabaab.9 Subsequently,
many Somalis in the United States and Canada reported undue scrutiny from the authorities and media as Somalis came to be profiled
at airports and at U.S.-Canada border crossings. Despite this uneasy
relationship, many Somali Americans continue to visit Somalia and
return home, engaging in no religious or political violence. Media reports
usually focus on those involved in the terrorist actions in Somalia and do
not cover those Somalis returning from vacation or family visits. Many
Somali Americans (and respectively, Somali Canadians) viewed this
unbalanced focus as an attack on the Somali community in general and
as a reinforcement of negative stereotyping.
Similarities and Dissimilarities to Other Immigrant Experiences
Similarities
How does the Somali community compare with the ethnic-racial
immigrant communities of the past? A reasonable comparison could
be to look at the experiences of those who came to the United States as
a result of wars and those who came as ordinary African immigrants.
This analysis provides a rich context because the experiences sometimes converge in terms of education, employment, barriers, and other
systemic problems, but diverge in other ways. Certainly it can be argued
that those fleeing from wars are more vulnerable and mostly unprepared for their new environments. They have psychological issues that
other immigrants may not have. Access to psychological services is
nonexistent because the immigration system was created to deal with
other social and economic issues. The younger Somalis who are born
in the United States are also dealing with unique issues, unlike other
immigrants, because of the psychological experiences and economic
and social conditions of their parents. Many face isolation and lack of
education and are totally unprepared for the new environment.
One similarity is the issue of gradual socio-cultural gap growing
between both the older and younger generations and the degree to which
each identifies with the “old country.” Many who arrived here extremely
young or who have been born here have little knowledge or feeling about
the clan strife that has afflicted Somalia for the past two decades. They
correspondingly have less of an emotional connection with Somalia. Also,
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as with other ethnic-racial immigrants, the worldview of the younger
generation is not always in line with that of the older generation, both
in terms of allegiance to the homeland and life in America. There is, in
short, a growing socio-cultural gap between the Somali generations in
the United States. Whether this gap is being more intensely experienced
by the Somali community than in previous immigrant communities is
difficult to say. In many cases, the salience of the affiliation to Somalia is
based on where they live and their awareness of a particular group that
emphasizes ties to the old country. In a sense, Somali-American youth are
living two lives—one in their homeland and another on Main Street.
Another obvious difficulty common to all new refugee-immigrant
populations has been language barriers and limited awareness of how
to access even the most basic community services. That problem has
not accompanied the Somalis’ arrival. As with the European immigrants
of many decades past and the new arrivals from Vietnam in the 1980s
or Central and South Americans more recently, the younger members of
the community adapt more quickly to the new environment in terms of
both language and culture. Consequently, this faster adaptation in turn
begets a generational status problem because the young often become
intermediaries for their elders. For example, it is the younger family
members who, in many cases, speak English better and have more readily adapted to the new host country and thus intercede with various
agencies on behalf of the family. This role can create embarrassment for
elders and a strain on family relationships as the parent-child hierarchy
is reversed, even if only temporarily.
Further, as with other new arrivals, there comes a point when
the members of the immigrant-refugee community feel collective
anxiety about their cultural heritage.10 In terms of timeline, it often
occurs between the generations of the initial arrivals and those born
in the United States. Again, it is the young who quickly adapt to the
new culture; for their elders, it is often all too quick. In this case, we
include in that first generation not only those born here, but also those
who arrived as very young children. In the Somali case, there are the
added pressures of the Somali language having been exclusively oral
until the early 1970s and the 30 years of conflict and living in the Diaspora that have eroded ethnic and extended family ties. Here in Boston,
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the African Community Economic Development of New England has
responded to these concerns by developing a Somali language class
that have taught approximately 80 students.11
Another similarity with other immigrant groups is the practice
of sending remittances back to “the old country.” Vietnamese refugees, for instance, have certainly provided support for families back in
Vietnam. From 1991 to 2005, the Vietnamese Diaspora sent $15 billion
to Vietnam.12 Yet, only a few years after the war, Vietnam had basically
stabilized. Unfortunately, Somalia is still in turmoil, a fact that makes
remittances even more crucial. According to the World Bank, recent
research documents that remittances to Somalia (which came to at least
$1 billion in 2006) constitute 23 percent of the income in urban Somali
households, such as those located in Hargeisa, with some 40 percent of
all households receiving assistance. A substantial segment of this money
is channeled into educational opportunities for Somali children.13
Differences
Certainly the most significant difference in Somali immigrants
is the religio-cultural. Nearly 100 percent of Somalis are Muslims. There
are approximately 28 mosques or centers that host Islamic services in
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. At least eight of the
mosques are located in the city of Boston: Yusuf Mosque on Chestnut Hill
Avenue in Brighton; Mosque for the Praising of Allah on Shawmut Avenue
in Roxbury; Masjid Al-Quran on Intervale Street, Dorchester; Muhammad’s Mosque #11 on Washington Street, Dorchester; Masjid Al-Noor on
Circuit Street, Roxbury; Allston Brighton Islamic Center on North Beacon
Street, Allston; and Masjid Al-Taqwa on Washington Street in Jamaica
Plain.14 Only the last one, Masjid Al-Taqwa, serves the Somali community
exclusively. Some of the mosques provide schooling for children over the
weekend, with lessons in Koran memorization and religious lectures.
Finally, there is the new and very impressive Islamic Society of Boston
Cultural Center on Malcolm X Boulevard in Roxbury Crossing. This is the
primary location of events for the greater Islamic community.
The composition of the Islamic service is different from a Christian Protestant service or a Catholic mass. An Islamic service includes
the muhadara, which is often a lecture about social issues. The subject
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can be almost anything: marriage, politics, the news of the week, or
important current issues. These events are scheduled and announced
by the mosque administration and open to everyone. The service also
includes the Friday prayer or qudba (a speech before the prayer). The
sequence usually has the speech first and the prayer last.
Also, the relationship of the religion to the individual is much
more of a community tie that does not quite translate into the progressive urban American environment. Ironically, perhaps its closest approximation may be found in the rural Christian communities of the Bible
Belt, where the first question asked of a newcomer is not “What do you
do?” (i.e., job or profession), but rather, “What church do you belong to?”
This similarity is ironic, because it is from these conservative Christian
communities that a great deal of fear of immigration is generated. Muslims can go to any mosque for prayer, but they usually go to the mosque
closest to them or the one where they can socialize more. This choice is
mostly nation-oriented. If you are Pakistani, you will mostly likely attend
services where most Pakistanis do. One other important distinction for
Muslims is whether a person is a Sunni Muslim or Shia Muslim; this difference in sect can also determine which mosque one goes to.
In addition to religion, some of the cultural normative differences
are perhaps worth noting, for it is often in work-a-day behaviors that
perceptions and misperceptions are created. In the Somali community,
normative behavior is to use the right hand for greeting and serving. The
left hand is considered “the lesser.” Also, traditionally members of the
opposite sex do not shake hands or hold hands in public. Depending on
the proximity to religious conservatism, women wear a rather distinct
“jilbab” (a more colorful hijab), with married women and single women
also differing in style of dress or head covering. Single Somali women
are more likely to be less stringent in covering up (the full dress) unless
they are very conservative. Whether one wears the full dress style or
simply a head covering is a personal choice and is not specifically connected to whether a woman is single or married.
The current state of conflict, ongoing since the end of the Cold War,
has no doubt fueled the culture-gap fear that lies underneath the surface
for the new Islamic immigrants and host communities in the United
States. The conclusion of the Cold War ushered in the end of bipolar
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sponsorship and demands by the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund for economic structural adjustments and international corporate
investments, which in turn were followed by political turmoil, ungoverned
areas, and a power vacuum in which chaos, war, and terror gained ground.
Much of this pattern has played out in Africa and in the Islamic global
sphere since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Political scientist Samuel Huntington has labeled the state of affairs as the
“clash of civilizations.” For the most part, a fear-driven process has stirred
up a variety of cultural concoctions of stereotyped positions.15
Pertinent Issues for the Community
Employment, Small Business Participation
Somalis own perhaps two dozen small businesses in Boston, with
the majority located in minority communities. On Harrison Avenue in
Roxbury, one mini-mall alone has approximately eight businesses operated by Somali women. Women are prominent in all forms of local
Somali enterprise, a rather crucial difference from other immigrant
communities. Other small business endeavors include restaurants,
coffee shops, dress and fabric shops, and convenience stores. Many of
these, such as the Butterfly Café, are located in the vicinity of the new
mosque on Malcolm X Boulevard. While the market focus of these
endeavors is on the Somali and general Islamic community via specialty items not found elsewhere, there are signs of their appeal spilling
over into other communities. One Somali convenience store also offers
Latino food specialties. The fabric and dress shops show signs of endurance, because their clothing items and accessories are virtually unique.
As one owner put it, “When they buy an item here, they know that they
will not come across another woman wearing the same thing.”
Financial issues for Somalis, and no doubt many new Muslim
immigrants as well, are credit and interest. Islam forbids interest. Yet, in
American society, credit and the interest that go with it are practically
omnipresent. The alternative for most Muslims in the United States is to
use a credit card but pay off the balance each month. This practice also
means that Muslim-owned businesses have to have significantly larger
cash reserves available, money often acquired through family and family connections. This mutual dependence leads to the hypothesis that
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networking is perhaps more essential in Somali and Islamic immigrant communities than among Americans in general. Yet, the fact is
that many Somalis have obtained loans, go into debt, own homes, or use
credit cards. The conservative Muslims typically advocate against interest-carrying loans. This counsel is mostly ignored due to the reality of life
in the United States, the West, and the ever-more-globalized economy.
The Somali professional community in Boston is still quite a fledgling sector, but its members do have a kind of informal association, with
occasional get-togethers. Nationally, there are Somali lawyers, dentists,
teachers, and police—but none in Boston as of yet. A few young professionals and engineers, however, are working for such large companies as
Raytheon, National Grid, State Street, Fidelity Investments, and major
hospitals in Boston. Also, they have yet to develop a strong presence in the
traditional blue-collar trades, such as masonry, roofing, carpentry, joinery,
framing, sheetrock/plaster work, painting, sheet metal work, electrical
wiring, and plumbing. More detailed occupational data on this growing
community simply do not exist. Most recently, in Boston new professional
networking groups have formed, such as the New England Somali Young
Professionals & Students. This group aims to connect local young Somalis
living in the New England area so that they may share resources, promote
events, and occasionally get together to organize events.
Education
The best numbers on the Somali presence in higher education
in Massachusetts that the authors could estimate are as follows. There
are approximately 100 Somali students at the University of Massachusetts Boston, perhaps another 100 at Bunker Hill Community College,
50 at Roxbury Community College, and smaller numbers dispersed
across the state. Somali students have struggled as they have tried to
assimilate into the culture of American higher education. Many face
a new language, culture, and way of learning. For example, although
more than 20 new students enroll at Bunker Hill Community College
each semester, only small percentage remain the following semester.
Some 90 percent of the new Somali students enroll in college
preparatory classes in high school; yet, they struggle as they face
other personal challenges. When asked, they often attribute poor
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performance to the lack of assistance at home because their parents
are unable to speak English. Somali students also frequently have to
work in order to support themselves and often support their families
as well. With parents who only speak Somali, many Somali students
must speak their native language at home and English in virtually
all other settings. Advocates indicate that there are few resources
that could fill the gap and provide support, enabling students to
thrive academically.
Higher education is only a small piece of the educational picture. A federal investigation determined that there was discrimination
in school assignments for young immigrant students and in English
language classes for the older generation. The older generation is most
often lost between the cracks when it comes to the availability and
cost of English language classes.16
This situation raises the question of the cost benefit of urban educational investment in Boston and Massachusetts. Boston has launched a
number of programs, such as the Newcomers Academy on Maxwell Street
in Dorchester, which is part of Boston International High School for students new to the United States, who have limited English-speaking skills
and whose education was interrupted in their nation of origin, impairing
their academic progress.17 These efforts were apparently undertaken in
response to a 2010 federal lawsuit in which investigators concluded that
the Boston public school system was violating the rights of limited English
speakers by failing to implement specialized education. The efforts are
investments that will pay dividends in the future. Subsequently, the Black
Educators Alliance of Massachusetts and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights under Law of the Boston Bar Association have filed suit over the
system’s school merger plans and its impact on students of color.18
By comparison, in Canada, governments at every level are seeking
ways to improve services for newcomers. It is, however, the community
that organizes itself and delivers services to the community. The government service design looks great on paper, but delivery is ineffective due to
poor leadership and lack of outreach to the community. Services designed
and implemented from above often fail to reach down to the local level.
At the elementary school level in Boston, the issue of school
assignments was brought up during a meeting with a dozen members of
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the Somali community. The Somalis in attendance pointed out that the
school system had a practice of automatically assigning Somali children to
particular schools, regardless of where they lived and whether the children
had a language issue or not. (This practice was not an actual policy, but it
was based on a perception that because the children were foreign born,
they must take English as a second language classes or special education
classes, without any assessment.) The perception-driven decisions behind
these assignments affected all new minority communities, not just Somalis. After a study documented this practice as a failure, the Office of the
Mayor of Boston subsequently initiated another study of the issue.
At the secondary and higher education levels, Somali youth who
spoke with the authors of this article felt a bit adrift and expressed
the need for mentors or counselors who could help them navigate
through their uncertainty; they also articulated a vague wish for a kind
of community-based learning project that could provide them with a
sense of focus.19 These uncertain feelings could be the reason why the
school dropout rate is high among many new refugee immigrant populations. Upon arrival, many school-age children in Boston are assigned to
schools or a grade level based on their age (particularly if the student has
no transcripts), not based on their academic background. Many Somalis
had no formal education while in refugee camps. Thus, they are assigned
to their “age grade,” but their skills may be at a much lower level.
Health Care
One of the problems confounding the delivery of health care is
the cultural reservations that many Somali women have about sharing
the information that providers seek. For conservative women from
Islamic cultures in general and Somali women in particular, even
being asked certain questions is embarrassing, and the older the
respondent the more embarrassment they feel. One study indicates
that of Somali women over the age of 40, only 68 percent have had a
mammogram, and only 35 percent have ever performed a self-exam.20
In addition, the phrasing of a question can create a defensive “looking
glass” reaction. For example, one woman interviewed indicated that a
common question asked by a nurse or doctor—“What brings you here
today?”—is considered insulting. The woman reasons that “obviously
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I am ill, or else why would I be here?” So offense is taken because the
patient worries that the doctor or nurse is implying that she is
not actually ill. The same interviewee indicated that rephrasing the
question to “What illness troubles you today?” would make a remarkable difference.
Although data are not readily available, it is felt that within the
Somali community, as with other refugee communities, that there is a
significant prevalence of anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder.
These mental health issues are particularly acute since nearly all families in the Diaspora are separated. Medical professionals may need
more nuanced kinds of assessment tools when initially interviewing
new patients from refugee populations.
Housing and Home Ownership
A number of Somali families are or have been homeless and
have stayed in a shelter. Some 90 percent of the Somali community
lives in some form of subsidized housing, either from the Boston
Housing Authority or under a federal Section 8 voucher. They share
that housing situation, despite the different arrival status of the two
major groups of Somalis in Boston: those who came before the start
of the warlord wars and those who have come since then. The former
arrived as students or under some other immigration category. Those
who came after 1993 have predominately done so as refugees.
There is probably a very low home ownership rate, because few
have financial security. Religio-cultural issues come into play as well.
On one hand, the notion of interest is anathema for many Islamic
faithful. The culturally acceptable way is to have the funds to make the
purchase of anything immediate and final with cash. The Somali culture (with the exception of the Somali-Bantu population) is a nomadic
culture; thus, the notion of particular and permanent roots is somewhat outside the norm. When ownership of housing is accomplished,
it is often done so by way of a number of loan configurations considered Sharia-compliant. Sharia is custom, incorporating the writings
of a number of clerics and referring to something that is legal according to Islam. There is a school of thought that rejects any interest
on money loaned, a viewpoint that leads to two alternatives: buy
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everything in cash or find an individual who offers the same
amount of money but calls the cost of borrowing something other
than interest.
Community Agency and Organizational Capacity
One indicator of immigrant acclimation is the presence, vitality,
and capacity of its community-based organizations and agencies. These
are reservoirs of social capital for families and individuals. Currently,
there are three Somali community agencies in Boston: African Community Economic Development of New England in Roxbury, Somali Development Center in Jamaica Plain, and Refugee and Immigrant Assistance
Center, also in Jamaica Plain. These agencies focus on specific areas, but
as with other nascent immigrant communities, they have to respond
to needs to be viable for the community. Their programs and program
development and maintenance are demand driven. Budgets are slim,
and there is competition for resources. Therefore, the financial health of
these organizations is difficult to assess.
There is little evidence of alliances between Somali Americans
and other African immigrant communities in Boston. There is little to
bring them together, particularly when the leadership of each is basically in the hands of elders, who tend to identify with customs in the
homeland rather than current needs in their present communities.
Thus, indifference or conflict operates more than cooperation. In the
last decade and more recently, the Boston community has seen the
development of community groups to address this situation. The Muslim American Society of Boston was established in 1999. Since that
time, numerous other groups have been organized, specifically the
Islamic Society of Boston and various national communities or student groups. Various websites provide listings of these organizations.21
From a community development perspective, young Somali
American professionals and local university students should engage
and volunteer with local Somali community agencies to help build their
capacity, enabling them to develop more robust programs that will benefit the Massachusetts Somali community at large and, in particular, its
youth. For instance, the agencies could develop key performance indicators or benchmarks for programs that reduce school dropout rates or
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youth violence, or programs that address family health, literacy, English
language learning, and job placement assistance.
For this collaboration between young talents and local community
agencies to succeed, the agencies should be more transparent about how
they operate, including the level of funding or grants that they have
received from the state and federal governments or other donors on
behalf of the Somali community. More important, these agencies should
allow the young talents to become board members, rather than selecting family members or close associates to sit on the boards. These young
Somalis are knowledgeable and likely to scrutinize youth programs
and suggest new ideas that can realign resources for better service to
the community.
Conclusion
The experiences of the Somali community and, to a considerable extent, other new African immigrant communities are both
disparate yet similar to those of previous immigrant groups. They are
disparate in terms of language, religion, and race when compared to
the Eurocentric immigrant communities of a hundred years ago, yet
similar in their experiences of intergenerational conflict between the
elders and the youth, and in terms of being isolated and experiencing
discrimination. Like many of the newcomers of the past, they have
educational and skill deficiencies and see few entry opportunities into
the more skilled blue-collar trades. Also, like other European immigrant groups of the 1950s, their community-based organizations are
often limited in capacity and reluctant to cooperate with each other
and the other African immigrant organizations in the city.
The greatest problem in constructing an accurate picture of the
Somali community in Massachusetts, the entire country, and Canada,
is the lack of data, despite the fact that several studies have been conducted.22 Census studies have failed to capture much information that
can shed light on the various new East African immigrant communities, of which the Somali community is the second largest, after the
Ethiopian immigrants. One possible way to surmount this difficulty is
to organize and develop a citywide census project that attempts to
get better population data and identify local businesses owned and
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operated by these new African immigrant communities. Another
would be to develop a community-based organization that would
specifically focus on addressing the issues and needs of the new
immigrant youth.
The biggest consideration going forward is the future of the Somali
youth. They are virtually at a crossroads. It is uncertain whether they will
remain attached to the older generation and, more important, whether
they will seek conventional means by which to achieve economic and
social advancement and secure their place in a productive social life or
fall into criminal activity. The community is seeking ways to inspire the
young people to pursue education. To an extent, the younger generation
is far less interested in fighting the old wars in the homeland and much
more oriented to gaining their slice of the American dream. In part, their
degree of interest in the old homeland versus the new will be determined
by their economic and political success, as well as by their cultural
integration. It is going to be difficult to determine their level of success
without some kind of a baseline study of the Somali community that can
provide extensive data on a number of socioeconomic indicators. Those
indicators would include growth in the professional and political sectors,
such as lawyers, doctors, state legislators, economists, and teachers.
While opinions can vary about the tipping point for indices of
success, one might suggest that representation in Congress is a powerful indicator of arrival. For example, only a few years ago the Vietnamese
community gained such a distinction—Republican immigration attorney
Anh “Joseph” Cao from Louisiana. In 2007, Keith Ellison of Minnesota
became the first member of Congress of the Islamic faith. The authors
of this article look forward to the arrival of the first Somali American in
Congress. That would serve as a solid benchmark.
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